The Incommensurability Problem: Evolution, Current Approaches and Recent Issues by Soler, Léna
 Philosophia Scientiæ
Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences 
8-1 | 2004
Le problème de l’incommensurabilité, un demi-siècle
après
The Incommensurability Problem: Evolution,
Current Approaches and Recent Issues
Introduction
Léna Soler
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/587
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.587
ISSN: 1775-4283
Publisher
Éditions Kimé
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 May 2004
Number of pages: 1-38
ISBN: 2-84174-338-1
ISSN: 1281-2463
 
Electronic reference
Léna Soler, « The Incommensurability Problem: Evolution, Current Approaches and Recent Issues », 
Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 8-1 | 2004, Online since 23 June 2011, connection on 21 April 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/587  ; DOI : 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.587 
Tous droits réservés
Introduction
The Incommensurability Problem:
Evolution, Current Approaches and Recent
Issues
Léna Soler
The idea that competing scientific theories may be incommensurable
was introduced in philosophy of science in 1962, simultaneously and
independently by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend1. Thereafter, in-
commensurability promptly became one of the most central and contro-
versial issues of 20th century philosophy of science. Half a century later,
how has this issue evolved? The present volume of Philosophia Scientiae
aims at providing the elements of an answer to this question.
I will begin by stating the problem as it can be formulated today, from
a point of view that allows us to distance ourselves from the most sig-
nificant misunderstandings involved in the earliest discussions on incom-
mensurability2 (and unfortunately still present in some recent works).
This choice will allow us, at the same time, to profit by some useful
distinctions that are nowadays available, but that were elaborated only
at the price of careful and thorough analyses carried out over the past
forty years.
1[Feyerabend 1962]; [Kuhn 1962]. On Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability
and its evolution, see [Hoyningen 1989]; [Hoyningen 1990]; [Sankey 1993]; [Hoyningen
1998]. For recent books on Kuhn considering incommensurability as a particular
aspect of Kuhn’s thought, see [Bird 2000]; [Laugier 2003]; [Nickless 2003]; [Read &
Sharrock 2002a]. For a precise comparison of Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s conceptions
of incommensurability, conducted both at the historical and at the analytical levels,
see [Hoyningen 2004].
2For a list and an analysis of such misunderstandings, see [Hoyningen 1989, section
6.3].
Philosophia Scientiæ, 8 (1), 2004, 1–38.
2 Introduction
Yet, before beginning to state the incommensurability problem from
a contemporary perspective, a brief clarification seems desirable if not
required. The term ‘incommensurability’ often operates in certain areas
of philosophy of science, today just as much as in the recent past, as a
repulsive-term, whose rhetorical function is to stigmatize some rejected
relativist-antirealist-sociological combination. As a result, a simple will-
ingness to talk about the ‘incommensurability problem’ and to mani-
fest interest in it is often equated with the acceptance of a relativistic-
antirealist-sociological position, in a sense that remains vague but car-
ries nevertheless the precise accusation of denigrating science up to an
intolerable point. This may encourage to talk of the incommensurabil-
ity/commensurability problem instead of the incommensurability prob-
lem tout court, precisely in order to stress that there is here a philosoph-
ical question — the only commitment implied being the conviction that
such question potentially offers something important and interesting to
think about. Now, I will not systematically use the rather unwieldy lo-
cution ‘incommensurability/commensurability problem’, but it is in this
spirit that I approach the problem.
The Incommensurability/Commensurability Problem
Let us now state the incommensurability/commensurability problem3.
At the most general level, it is the problem of characterizing a par-
ticular kind of deep transformations occurred in the history of science.
The main related epistemological issues coincide with some central issues
of 20th century general philosophy of science, namely, scientific realism,
scientific rationality and scientific progress.
It is not by chance that such problem became increasingly important
in the course of the last century. Indeed, the 20th century saw the devel-
opment of new scientific theories showing unexpected characteristics that
seemed to break in many central respects with earlier theories. This was
notably the case in physics4, that is, in the field functioning at the time
as the paradigmatic object of epistemology. These deep transformations
have appeared to some philosophers as a refutation of scientific realism;
have led them to weaker and weaker conceptions of scientific progress
3For panoramic presentations of the problem, see [Hoyningen & Sankey 2001, vii-
xxx]; [Sankey 1994a]; [Sankey 1997b]; [Soler 2000a, 180-191]. These references are
most of the time useful with respect to the different particular aspects that will be
examined below, although I will not systematically repeat them each time.
4Especially with quantum physics. See for example [Bitbol 1996], [D’Espagnat
2002].
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(so weak that their foes equate them with the claim that there is no
scientific progress); and have correlatively led them to deny that there
may be rational grounds for the judgement that one theory is objectively
better than another.
To go a little bit further, two kinds of scientific changes, and
correlatively two kinds of incommensurabilities, have been pro-
gressively recognized as different in principle, and are currently distin-
guished in contemporary philosophy of science: the so-called ‘semantic’
and ‘methodological’ ones.
1. Let us begin with changes (and possibly incommensurability)
arising at the level of theoretical contents (or at the level of content
tout court5). They are most of the time called semantical changes, and
I will also label them ‘descriptive changes’6.
These changes concern what rival theories ‘say’ about the object
under study. They concern ontological changes in the broader sense of
5I use the expression ‘content tout court’ because I think that, at the level of
contents, a generic expression in which the adjective ‘theoretical’ does not appear
is needed. This in order to include, within the category of ‘contents’, propositions
that the philosopher of science supposes to be assumed by scientists but that he is
reluctant to label ‘theoretical’. My concern, here, is to free as much as possible the
characterization of incommensurability from the ambiguities and disagreements as-
sociated to the terms ‘theory’, ‘theoretical’, etc. Contemporary philosophy of science
shows that the usages of the word ‘theory’ are not at all homogeneous, and that
there are disagreements about what can be legitimately labeled ‘theoretical’. Such
disagreements and shifts in usage can be understood as a undesirable effect of some
(in themselves beneficial) insights of the last century philosophy of science. The
now widely accepted thesis of the theory-ladeness of any observation, the recognition
that measurement instruments are ‘materialized theories’ (according to Bachelard’s
famous expression), and many other assumptions of the same kind, had together the
effect that any aspect of scientific practices — experimental instrumented actions and
manipulations included — can in a sense be said ‘theoretical’. But in that case, the
label ‘theoretical’, being unable to discriminate anything, is useless. And if, taking
the later conclusion into account, we accept that non-theoretical contents (or rela-
tively less theoretical contents) are involved in scientific practices, we have to decide
what we are ready to call non- or less- theoretical. Taking all that into account, I am
looking for a conception of ‘contents’ sufficiently wide to cover, if required, propo-
sitions not extracted from systematic high level theories. Propositions such as, for
example, more or less implicit — but up to a point articulable — assumptions about
the working of material devices involved in laboratory life.
6Although ‘semantic changes’ and ‘semantic incommensurability’ are the standard
expressions found nowadays in the specialized literature, I prefer to talk of ‘changes in
(theoretical) contents’ or ‘changes in descriptive contents’, in order to avoid possible
ambiguities resulting from the fact that the semantic lexicon is used with a pecu-
liar technical meaning in particular areas of our philosophy of science (for example
the structural approach of science) or in fields closely linked to this philosophy (for
example logic).
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the word, that is, changes in the kinds of beings and processes supposed
to populate the world according to the theory.
Content changes are often analysed relying on a linguistic theory that
distinguishes meaning and reference as well as intension and extension.
At the level of meaning, we have the well known problem of ‘meaning
change’, that comprises the question of understanding how such changes
arise, how to delimitate the meaning units and legitimately conclude
that they are sufficiently equivalent (synonymy) or significantly different
(genuine meaning change), and with what kinds of epistemological con-
sequences. And at the level of references, we find notably the question
of determining whether references of key scientific terms have indeed
changed in the actual history of science, as well as the question of elab-
orating theories of language according to which reference is sufficiently
independent of meaning to allow reference invariance despite of drastic
meaning change7.
2. Side by side with changes of contents, there may be changes (and
possibly incommensurability) arising at the level of the norms of
research. They are most of the time called methodological changes,
and I will also label them ‘axiological changes’.
These are changes in the answers (often tacitly) given to questions
of the kind: what is the aim of scientific research? What are the central
features of a genuine investigation, of a genuine scientific theory, or of a
genuine scientific explanation? What kinds of problems and solutions are
authentically scientific, and what kinds are not? What are the features
of a good proof, what is a convincing argument?
In short, the category ‘norms of research’ comprises the whole set of
values underlying scientific investigation. Changes at the level of ‘norms
of research’ covers all types of axiological changes8, from the most local
and apparently anecdotal ones, to the most global and visibly conse-
quential ones that culminate in massive transformations of the general
7See below for more details, and notes 15 et 35 for references.
8That is why I prefer to talk of ‘norms of research’ rather than of ‘methodology’
(or ‘methodological changes’, or ‘methodological incommensurability’), despite the
fact that the later expressions, and not the former, are commonly employed in the
specialized literature. It is of course always possible to demand that ‘methodology’
be understood in a broad sense, so as to be able to meet all kinds of axiological
changes. However, ‘methodology’ is usually understood in a narrower and stronger
sense (according to which one could be reluctant to include, for example, exemplars
in the Kuhnian sense). Moreover, the ‘methodology’ lexicon has quite inevitable
undesirable connotations, being associated to the (now famously refuted) idea of
universal algorithmic rules and procedures allowing to prove scientific hypotheses
and to choose between scientific theories.
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idea of scientificity itself.
3. The incommensurability of contents, or descriptive incom-
mensurability, is more currently named ‘semantic incommensurability’
or again — in a somewhat particular interpretation of what is at is-
sue — taxonomic incommensurability. It designates important differ-
ences of a particular type between competing scientific theories, scientific
paradigms or scientific traditions.
The problem of the incommensurability of contents9 has several facets.
First it consists, adopting a synchronic approach to compare two
historical cross sections artificially extracted from the continuous flow
of the history of science, in achieving a fine-grained characterization of
the descriptive differences at stake. Roughly speaking, these differences
manifest an incompatibility that is not reducible to a simple logical con-
tradiction. This incompatibility is apparently related to differences in
the linguistic (and more generally symbolic) resources themselves, so
that intuitively, one is inclined to say that there is no common measure
at the very level of what is thinkable, expressible or symbolizable.
Such an incompatibility has been characterized by the late Kuhn, and
is currently described in recent works, as the impossibility of translating
the words of one theory (or more exactly some key words of one theory)
into the vocabulary or the symbols of the other. It is in such framework
that the label ‘taxonomic incommensurability’ is used10.
Kuhn’s conception of taxonomic incommensurability is deeply ground-
ed in a definite holistic conception of language. Roughly speaking,
Kuhn’s idea — here largely re-expressed in my words — is that the set of
signs used by scientists involves non-decomposable sub-systems. These
sub-systems are non-decomposable, in the sense that they are clusters in
which all terms reciprocally delimit their content, so that none of them
can be determined without recourse to the others, nor, therefore, be taken
apart without being deeply denatured. In other words, each single sig-
nifier is defined by its relations to other signifiers. Put differently, each
signifier takes its sense (or — depending of the chosen framework, and
with nuances that will be ignored here — each takes its meaning, or con-
ceptual content, or intension, or linguistic value. . . ) from the structure
9See references note 3.
10The expression ‘taxonomic incommensurability’ seems to have been introduced
by H. Sankey in a paper headed, precisely, “taxonomic incommensurability” [Sankey
1998]. In addition to the references given in note 3, see [Bird 2000, chapter 5];
[Chen 1997]; [Hacking 2003]; [Kuhn 1983a]; [Kuhn 1991]; [Kuhn 1993]; [Sankey
1990]; [Sankey 1991b]; [Sankey 1992]; [Sankey 1998]; [Soler 2000b]; [Soler 2003];
[Soler 2004b].
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of the vocabulary (possibly including observational terms11) at the heart
of which it lies. Such a fragment of taxonomy, also called by Kuhn a
“lexicon”, encapsulates a network of similarity and dissimilarity relations
that are applied to the world as a whole and determine what is of the
same kind and what is of different kind. Kuhn talks about “local holism”
[Kuhn 1983a]. In this framework, “taxonomic incommensurability” des-
ignates the non-homology — or the impossibility of superimposition —
of the two lexicons underlying the two theories under comparison. Kuhn
insists — and this is in my opinion a very important point not always
integrated by people working on incommensurability — that this non
homology, which defines incommensurability and is responsible for the
untranslatability, does not at all mean the impossibility of mastering the
incommensurable theory. One can become bilingual, even if it requires
effort and even if it is more usually the task of historians of science than
the one of scientists. And once bilingual, it is possible to understand the
rival incommensurable theory although it is still impossible to translate
the words of one into the words of the other12.
Second, the problem of semantic incommensurability also consists in
the discussion, again in a synchronic perspective, about how deep the
differences of contents encountered in the actual history of science are
and about whether invariants can be found.
Third, the problem of semantic incommensurability understood in
the broader sense requires the examination, this time in a diachronic
approach concerning transformations that arise along a temporal line, of
the historical reasons that have led to major descriptive bifurcations. It
requires the analysis of their nature and the evaluation of their cognitive
value
The most obvious and most debated epistemological issue pertaining
to the incommensurability of scientific contents is the problem of scien-
tific realism13. The simple claim that there are scientific revolutions at
the descriptive level, i.e. the claim that there are, in the actual history
of science, massive and deep ruptures at the level of ‘what science tells
11‘Observational’ has of course to be understood here in a contextually determined
and pragmatic sense : in the sense of ‘taken to be observational for a given (indi-
vidual or collective) subject at a given stage of knowledge’, that is, ‘taken to name
unproblematically directly perceptible and given states of affairs’. Kuhn is ready to
maintain the distinction observational/theoretical, provided that one understands the
boundary as an historically-moving one (see [Kuhn 1993], and the analysis given by
Emiliano Trizio in the present volume).
12[Kuhn 1983a]; [Sankey 1991c].
13[Sankey 1994a]; [Sankey 1997c]. For recent contributions especially centred on
incommensurability and realism, see for example [Brown 2001] and [Devitt 2001].
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us about the world’, is, in itself, already a threat for any variety of corre-
spondentist or convergent realism. Yet, the more precise claim that these
descriptive scientific disruptions originate from deep differences rooted
in the very resources of what is expressible, is far more subversive, since
it incites to question the very formulation of the problem of the rela-
tion between human theories and their non-human referent. At least, it
forces us to face seriously the idea of a constitutive power of language
in science. And the positions adopted concerning such questions engage
determined positions about scientific progress14.
4. The incommensurability of research-norms, or axiologic in-
commensurability, is more currently called ‘methodological incommen-
surability’. It designates important differences, tensions and incompat-
ibilities between the normative idea of scientificity underlying two rival
research traditions: differences between the conceptions of what is a
genuine science, of what is a sound scientific explanation, of what is a
scientifically acceptable proof or convincing argument, and so on.
The problem of the incommensurability of research-norms15 consists,
first, in the search for a fine-grained analytical characterization of such
differences.
Second, it consists correlatively in the discussion — conducted from a
synchronic perspective contrasting two frozen pictures isolated from our
history of science — about how deep are the axiological transformations
encountered in the practices that we are ready to categorize as ‘science’
— considering the actual human history and the evolutions of the nor-
mative idea of scientificity that this history manifests. An important
aspect of such discussion corresponds to the search for invariant axio-
logical features that human activities should possess to be legitimately
labelled ‘scientific’. Such a quest today no longer amounts to the ques-
tion about the existence of a universal and quasi-automatic scientific
method enabling to find the truth, but it is, no doubt, an heir of that
question reshaped in a way that allows the integration of the teachings
14On incommensurability of contents and the intertwined questions of meaning
change, reference change and realism, see for example: [Achinstein 1964]; [Andersen
2001]; [Andersen 2002]; [Baltas 1990]; [Bartels 1995]; [Bird 2000]; [Carrier 2000];
[Carrier 2001]; [Carrier 2002]; [Feyerabend 1965a]; [Feyerabend 1987a]; [Field 1973];
[Kitcher 1978]; [Kitcher 1983]; [Kordig 1971]; [Kroon 1985]; [Kroon 1987]; [Kuhn
1983a]; [Kuhn 1983b]; [Kuhn 1984]; [Kuhn 1987]; [Kuhn 1989]; [Kuhn 1990]; [Kuhn
1991]; [Kuhn 1993]; [Nercessian 2001]; [Nola 1980]; [Norris 1997]; [Papineau 1979];
[Papineau 1996]; [Putnam 1973]; [Putnam 1975a]; [Putnam 1975b]; [Rasmussen 1987];
[Sankey 1991d]; [Sankey 1994a]; [Sankey 1997b]; [Shapere 1966]; [Soler 2000b]; [Soler
2003]; [Soler 2004a]; [Soler 2004b].
15For an overview, see [Sankey 1997a].
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of the post-positivist philosophy of science. In any case, we cannot com-
pletely avoid the question of the axiological features that are ‘essentially’
or ‘analytically’ associated with science — even if the later adjectives are
most of the time understood today in a evolving and pragmatical sense
referred to the scheme of family resemblances rather than to the one of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
Third — and maybe more important with respect to epistemologi-
cal consequences that have been, in the history of philosophy of science,
intimately associated with incommensurability –, the problem of axio-
logical incommensurability corresponds to the task of characterizing, on
a diachronic axis, the historical reasons having led to major axiological
bifurcations.
The central epistemological issue commonly associated with the in-
commensurability of scientific norms is the problem of relativism. Rel-
ativism is here understood as the problem of knowing whether human
beings — and in particular human being categorized as ‘scientists’ —
have at their disposal genuine justifications — or at least sufficiently
good reasons — for comparing the merits of incompatible systems of
cognitive norms, and especially in order to decide what is good or what
is better at the level of validation procedures. The term ‘incommensura-
bility’ refers here to the idea that no universal ultimate standard of that
sort is available, so that there is ‘no common measure’ between different
incompatible axiological options, in the sense that there is in principle
no ultimate legitimate tribunal before which all different options should
appear in order to be situated on a trans-historic scale of ‘cognitive sat-
isfiability’. In such an epistemological configuration, widely perceived as
dramatic by philosophers of science, one is quite irresistibly inclined to
conclude, from the human impossibility of deciding in the absolute what
is cognitively better, to the idea that all human practices and elabora-
tions are on the same level and have the same value. In other words
one is inclined to conclude — with despair or delectation according to
one’s temperament — that relativism is inescapable. Following these
lines, axiological incommensurability seems to imply relativism, and the
former has often been equated with the later.
Philosophy of science at the end of the 20th century showed that such
a conclusion is not at all necessary — although the terminology of incom-
mensurability remains widely and quasi-automatically associated with
the adoption of a relativistic stance. This conclusion looks necessary only
against the background of a (more or less tacit) foundationalist frame-
work. Yet, several non-foundationalist strategies have been proposed in
response to radically sceptical conclusions of the kind explained above:
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forms of naturalism, revised conceptions of transcendentalism, new ex-
perimentalism. . . These approaches led to non-foundationalist and non-
realist – or realist in a shifted sense — accounts of scientific progress16.
5. It is worth rendering explicit that the distinction between the
two kinds of incommensurability, although analytically very useful
for it allows us to deal with the questions one by one, is in most real cases
not a separation in re. Actual historical situations show complex inter-
actions between the available scientific contents and the scientific cogni-
tive values shaping the idea of scientificity in a given state of knowledge.
It remains nevertheless possible, at least as a step in a philosophical re-
search program labouring under the generic label of incommensurability,
to isolate and explore separately circumscribed problems coming more
particularly under one of the two headings of descriptive or normative
incommensurability.
It has moreover to be said that the methodological versus semantic
incommensurability distinction is not just an analytical distinction be-
tween two forms of incommensurability. It is also a distinction grounded
in the social fact that there are two separate literatures on incommen-
surability. The main literature that normally goes under the head of
incommensurability is about semantic issues like meaning variance, ref-
erence change, translation failure, etc. There is, however, an even larger
literature on variation of methods, standards, norms, criteria, etc., which
surrounds the topic of rational theory choice and epistemological rela-
tivism and which thus concerns what have been called above ‘method-
ological incommensurability’, but this literature does not currently use
the term ‘incommensurability’ — although Kuhn himself started it with
his talk of ‘incommensurability of standards’ in [Kuhn 1962]17.
6. Machinic-literal incommensurability.
Semantical and methodological incommensurability exhaust the kinds
of incommensurability commonly mentioned in most contemporary sys-
tematic global presentations of the problem. However in the last decades,
16On the problem of axiological incommensurability and the intertwined questions
of norm variance, rationality and relativism, see for example: Doppelt’s papers men-
tioned in the bibliography; [Feyerabend 1975]; [Feyerabend 1983]; [Feyerabend 1987b];
[Forster 2000]; [Hoyningen & Sankey 2001, 159-205]; [Kitcher 1983]; [Kitcher 1993];
[Kuhn 1962]; [Lakatos & Musgrave 1970]; Laudan’s papers mentioned in the bib-
liography; [Nola & Sankey 2001]; [Nola & Sankey 2000b]; [Sankey 1994b]; [Sankey
1995]; [Sankey 1996a]; [Sankey 1996b]; [Sankey 1997a]; [Shapere 1984]; [Shapere
2001]; Siegel’s papers mentioned in the bibliography; [Zheng 1988].
17Contributors to the latter literature are people like Laudan, Doppelt, Siegel,
etc., whereas contributors to the former literature are for example Putnam, Devitt,
Kitcher, etc. (see references in the bibliography).
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authors like Andrew Pickering and Ian Hacking claimed to have discov-
ered “a new and fundamental type of incommensurability”18 ignored by
traditional philosophers of science.
Such an incommensurability concerns competing scientific practices
having stabilized on the basis of different measurement processes, in-
struments, machines, and laboratory practices, so that at a point they
became, in Hacking’s terms, “literally” incommensurable, in the sense
that there is, properly speaking, no shared physical measure between
them. Pickering calls the same kind of configuration “machinic incom-
mensurability” [Pickering 1995, 189]. The relation between the 1960s and
the 1970s particle physics offers for example, according to Pickering, a
striking example of machinic incommensurability19.
The idea of literal or machinic incommensurability has been rela-
tively recently introduced and has not been widely discussed — at least
with reference to the traditional incommensurability problem and if we
compare with the immense literature devoted to traditional forms of in-
commensurability. Pickering and Hacking presented it as new and intro-
duced it in contrast with language-based characterizations and theory-
dominated orientations — claiming for example that it “has nothing to
do with ‘meaning change’ and other semantic notions that have been
associated with incommensurability” [Hacking 1992, 56-57].
However, the novelty of what is at stake and, more important, its ex-
act relations with the traditional forms of incommensurability, deserve
in my opinion more discussion20. As far as I can understand the situa-
tion on the basis of the fragmentary investigations already undertaken,
my provisional conclusion is the following. ‘Machinic-literal incommen-
surability’ is not a new kind of incommensurability, in the sense that
18[Hacking 1992, 54]. Also quoted by [Pickering 1995, 187].
19For the detailed study of the historical case, see [Pickering 1984]. The relations
between such historical case itself and incommensurability is first characterized in
[Pickering 1984, section 14.3]. For later developments and re-qualification in the
framework of Pickering’s conception of the “Mangle of practice”, see [Pickering 1995].
It is only in that last book that the expression “machinic incommensurability” ap-
pears. For studies not all especially centered on incommensurability but that provide
elements connected with the idea of a ‘pragmatic incommensurability’ arising at the
level of experimental practices, see also [Ackermann 1985], [Bensaude-Vincent 1993],
[Bensaude-Vincent & Stenger 2001], [Buchwald 1995], [Collier 1984], [Galison 1987],
[Gooding 1992], [Hacking 1983], [Hacking 1988], [Hacking 1999], [Latour 1997], [Pick-
ering 1994].
20I recently examined the question in three talks: a first one given in Montreal
in September 2003 at a conference organized by the SOPHA (now submitted for
publication); and in two later talks given in October and March 2004, in the context of
my seminar devoted to the incommensurability problem at the Collège International
de Philosophie, Paris.
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what it refers to does not require the introduction of a third additional
category side by side with those of incommensurability of contents and
incommensurability of norms. However, the study of what is at stake
may introduce some novelty in the classical characterization of the in-
commensurability problem, since ‘machinic-literal incommensurability’
involves a shift in the grammatical subject of incommensurability. In-
deed, what is classically termed ‘incommensurable’ is ‘something’ at the
level of theoretical practices, whereas here, it is ‘something’ at the level
of experimental practices (the problem being then: what exactly? With
what epistemological consequences? And: do such consequences legit-
imize the recourse to the incommensurable lexicon?).
7. Understood according to the presentation given above, the in-
commensurability problem covers a broad and complex network of ques-
tions. Thus choices had to be made concerning the composition of
the present volume. The volume takes incommensurability of con-
tents as the starting point, and it is led from there to touch on other
dimensions or species of incommensurability. Two papers are especially
devoted to machinic-literal incommensurability. However, axiological in-
commensurability is not directly tackled and remains more or less in the
background21.
Such a choice follows, in a way, the historical movement of the in-
commensurability debate — hoping that this will serve the aim of under-
standing better the present state of the problem. Indeed the incommen-
surability problem, after its introduction and the early attempts of clar-
ifications in the sixties, progressively shrank, in the actual discussions
of philosophers of science, to the more restricted problem of semantic
incommensurability. This arose notably under the influence of Kuhn’s
later stress on language, taxonomic structures and translation, as a sort
of retarded incidence of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’. Philosophers of
science did not, in this movement, completely abandon the constellation
of questions listed above under the heading of ‘axiological incommensu-
rability’. But they did not establish a systematic and explicit association
between these questions and the incommensurability label22. Now in re-
cent decades, the previously circumscribed incommensurability problem
has been re-enlarged afresh, with attempts to include in the picture the
instrumental, experimental layer of scientific activities, this time in the
broader context of the so-called ‘pragmatic turn’.
21For a recent book on incommensurability making room to methodological in-
commensurability side by side with semantic incommensurability, see [Hoyningen &
Sankey 2001].
22See [Sankey 1994a].
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Current Approaches to Incommensurability
Before presenting one by one the different papers constituting the present
book, let us have a brief overview of the main methodological options
nowadays available and alive in studies on incommensurability. Without
claiming that the contributions of the book offer an exhaustive sample
of the existing options, I have been anxious to make room to different
and often opposed ones.
Not surprisingly, the main trends constituting contemporary reflec-
tions on science are also found in special studies focused on the incom-
mensurability problem. We will consider here, first the analytical ver-
sus historical ways of examining science, then the linguistic, pragmatic
and cognitive approaches of incommensurability, and finally, more spe-
cific and sometimes overlapping orientations such as the Wittgenstein-
inspired one.
1. The distinction between the analytical and the historical
approaches of science has often been thought, especially in the anglo-
saxon world before the sixties, as an opposition and a quite strong one.
Even today, it is still conceived as an opposition in certain areas of phi-
losophy of science. However, this general tendency became less and less
important within the group of philosophers studying incommensurabil-
ity. Within this group the analytical and the historical determinations
widely appear today to be two complementary and required approaches
rather than two mutually exclusive ones. Almost all authors working
on incommensurability today are anxious to examine available historical
case studies (if not to explore themselves particular historical scientific
episodes), in order to achieve a characterization of incommensurability
both inspired by and conformed to historical ‘data’ about scientific de-
velopment. One of the ‘fathers of incommensurability’, namely Kuhn,
himself contributed very much, as it is well-known, to the progressive
recognition, in the anglo-saxon world, of the necessity of taking the his-
torical dimension into account when tackling many central questions of
philosophy of science and notably the incommensurability problem23.
2. The linguistic approach has been adopted by Feyerabend in
his early characterization of incommensurability24, as well as by the late
Kuhn25, and it is through it that incommensurability has been most
widely and deeply explored. In the present volume, this approach is
typically represented by the works of Alexander Bird, Martin Carrier
23See especially [Kuhn 1962] and [Kuhn 1992].
24See reference note 1.
25See references note 10.
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and Léna Soler. The papers of Hanne Andersen, Soazig Le Bihan and
Emiliano Trizio, although they are less prototypical of works committed
to the linguistic approach and although they explicitly aim at considering
non-linguistic aspects of incommensurability, are also closely linked to
the linguistic dimension in several important respects.
The linguistic approach to science is often accused of reducing science
to language or of being too restricted to achieve a sound characterization
of science. However, it is in my opinion neither fair to much work focused
on the linguistic dimension, nor philosophically fruitful, to equate it with
the positive strong thesis that science is essentially a linguistic reality
and nothing more. The emphasis on the linguistic dimension may more
productively be understood as a methodological orientation aiming at
characterizing an important but not exhaustive dimension of the studied
object. This being said, to choose to characterize incommensurability
by a linguistic approach is of course not a neutral choice. Assuming
that it is coherent, such a choice presupposes the minimal belief that
incommensurability of scientific contents corresponds to drastic linguistic
changes.
The task is then to analyse such changes with the help of a suitable
theory of language: to find or elaborate a linguistic framework able to
account for the phenomena associated with incommensurability. We can
classify the possible theories by means of schematic traditional oppo-
sitions, such as atomistic versus holistic conceptions; extensive versus
intensive characterizations; non-descriptive models centred on reference
(the most famous being the so-called ‘causal theory of reference’) versus
models focused on sense and descriptive aspects; theories relying on the
idea of necessary and sufficient conditions governing the ascriptions of
meaning and reference, versus theories relying on the weaker, Wittgen-
steinian idea of family resemblances. . .
The question concerning the most suitable linguistic framework is
still a much debated issue today. However, dominant trends emerged
in the course of the 20th century that influenced the discussion of the
incommensurability problem.
First, it has been largely recognized that the paradigm of necessary
and sufficient conditions did not govern actual scientific linguistic usage.
Such a recognition led philosophers to cope with indeterminacies linked
to the working of language — the most famous one being the Quinian
indeterminacy of translation — and to analyse the way these indetermi-
nacies affect judgments of incommensurability26. Correlatively, it gave
26See [Field 1973]; [Norris 1997]; [Quine 1960], [Quine 1969] and [Quine 1987];
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rise to developmental perspectives focused on linguistic learning pro-
cesses, often in close connexion to empirical studies coming from cultural
anthropology or, more recently, cognitive sciences.
Second, it has been widely admitted that holistic aspects of scientific
languages had to be taken seriously and to be integrated in the charac-
terization of incommensurability. Consequently the discussion has been
directed to the strength of such holism and on the associated problem of
extracting and delimitating significant linguistic units (units that can be
legitimately considered to have a sufficient autonomy relatively to the
larger linguistic system to which they pertain). This gave rise to the
problem of local/global incommensurability27.
It has been realised, thirdly, that reference-determination of sci-
entific terms was never absolutely independent of meaning- or sense-
determinations, and this led to the elaboration of mixed theories of
reference combining descriptive and non-descriptive (often conceived as
causal) factors. Many people wishing to show that incommensurabil-
ity is not a threat for realism since it can be conciliated with trans-
paradigmatic continuity of the reference of scientific terms, have built
on such mixed accounts28.
Fourth, as it is well known, the impossibility of drawing an absolute-
invariant-natural frontier between the observational and the theoreti-
cal levels has appeared ineluctable. We are thus left with the problem
of reconciliating the need of the distinction with the inescapability of
its relativization. This problem is of course intimately associated with
holism and with the dependence of reference on sense: the observa-
tional/theoretical demarcation is a moving one since intuitively obser-
vational terms are not independent of other terms, including intuitively
theoretical terms.
These intertwined recognitions and their associated difficulties lead
to what has often appeared as an important paradox. Incommensurable
theories have to be competing theories, otherwise the judgment of incom-
mensurability is epistemologically trivial and deprived of any interesting
consequence (think, for example, of the claim that thermodynamics and
the theory of the unconscious are incommensurable). Yet by definition,
competing theories target a common realm of phenomena, which means
that they must admit shared observations (observations for which they
[Sankey 1991a]; [Soler 2004a]; [Weed 1997].
27Kuhn introduced local holism and incommensurability in [Kuhn 1983a]; see
[Hoyningen 1989, 112ff]. See also [Carrier 2001], [Chen 1990], [Soler 2000b] and
[Soler 2003].
28For more details and references, see note 35.
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both claim responsibility). Thus we must be able to extract a com-
mon observational layer assumed by both of them. This amounts to
saying that we must retain something of the observational/theoretical
dichotomy and make its sense clear. And this amounts at the same
time to the assumption of local holism and to tackling the difficulty of
stating how to recognize sufficiently independent clusters of terms and
statement in concrete cases, how to separate incommensurable concepts
from commensurable ones. But if all of this is admitted, it seems now
that the so-called incommensurable theories are not so incommensurable
after all, since they have a phenomenal common measure29. Aspects of
this paradox are examined in some works of the present volume.
People working within the linguistic approach may have very differ-
ent philosophical aims and outlooks. The latter are most of the time
already apparent in the linguistic options that each author favours. As
an illustration, we can compare Bird’s and Carrier’s work on incommen-
surability. Bird ultimately aims at defending scientific realism and at
showing that incommensurability is harmless for scientific realism. In
order to do so he favours, like many realist-oriented thinkers, to rely
on an accommodated causal theory of reference. Carrier, for his part,
assumes that there indeed are drastic descriptive revolutions involving
drastic changes in reference, so that common versions of scientific realism
are indeed threatened; and he assumes correlatively that causal theories
of reference are of little use to save realism (which does not mean, Carrier
insists, that we are committed to strong relativism, since rival incom-
mensurable theories, although untranslatable, can be compared with re-
spect to their empirical adequacy). This being admitted, Carrier favours
a Wittgenstein-inspired (contextual and pragmatic) theory of meaning,
and intends to provide in such framework a refined characterization of
Kuhn’s taxonomic incommensurability.
3. Approaching incommensurability with a pragmatic perspective
constitutes another option, more and more praised, along the 20th cen-
tury, in studies of incommensurability as well in other areas of studies re-
flecting on sciences. Although part of Kuhn’s originality in [Kuhn 1962]
was to emphasize pragmatic and implicit factors inherent to scientific
activity, Kuhn’s later language-based characterization of incommensu-
rability took little notice of this dimension, to the regret of some of his
readers. In this volume, the pragmatic approach to incommensurability
is represented by the papers of Michel Bitbol and Emiliano Trizio.
Pragmatic oriented studies interested in the incommensurability prob-
29Around these lines of thought, see [Carrier 2001], [Feyerabend 1972]; [Shapere
1964]; [Soler 2003]; [Soler 2004a].
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lem have most of the time grown in opposition to language- and high-
level-theory-centred accounts. Science, they urged, cannot be reduced to
language and is an activity involving many other essential dimensions.
No more can science be reduced to the production of high-level theories
aiming at describing the world: science is as much — and in some ac-
counts primarily — an empirical and most of the time experimental con-
crete activity involving concrete material objects and concrete actions-
manipulations (for example the ones constituting laboratory life). Thus,
a complete characterization of incommensurability cannot itself be re-
duced to linguistic characterizations and theory comparison. It must
include non-linguistic, non-theoretical concrete aspects of scientific prac-
tices. And it must take into account the non-explicit and in principle
not totally verbalizable elements that irreducibly constitute scientific
activities. This is maintained, not only with respect to the level of the-
orization (for example more or less local know-how concerning abstract
problems resolution, partially tacit goals and values constraining theo-
retical options, etc.), but also with respect to the level of laboratory life
(for example more or less local know-how concerning the manipulation
of instruments and the interpretation of machinic termini, partially tacit
goals and values constraining experimental options, etc.).
On the basis of these shared requirements, the problem is how to
elaborate an adequate framework allowing us to describe scientific prac-
tices in all their richness and variety. It is at this level that some dis-
agreements arise. Some concern the elaboration and the choice of the
relevant variables30. Others concern the allowed and best ways to access
to the tacit aspects of science and render them graspable. Still others
concern the relations that can hold in principle, or that actually hold
in concrete historical cases, between high-level theoretical practices and
experimental laboratory practices. What is the most suitable model? A
model in which one of the two poles is understood (possibly alternately)
as the driving force conditioning the evolution of the other, if not as the
cause determining such evolution? Or an interactionist model in which
each actual scientific stage of development is understood as the emergent
symbiotic result of a complex holistic equilibrium in which all elements
mutually support each other? Do the two poles have a certain relative
autonomy, and if it is the case, to what extent? And so on31.
It is in such a framework that the incommensurability labelled “lit-
eral” by Hacking and “machinic” by Pickering takes place. As for the
present volume, Michel Bitbol examines the idea of an incommensura-
30See for example [Hacking 1992, sections 6-9]
31
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bility of laboratory life, on the one hand with reference to the Kuhnian
and traditional linguistic-based characterizations of incommensurability,
and on the other hand in the light of Pickering’s and Hacking’s account
of science and literal incommensurability. Emiliano Trizio, for his part,
explores the relations between literal incommensurability and taxonomic
incommensurability, arguing that the alleged gap between them can be
filled.
4. It would be and exaggeration to talk about a cognitive approach
to incommensurability, since incommensurability is not a special focus
of the proliferating field of cognitive studies. There are, nevertheless,
analyses of the incommensurability problem that intend to rely on the
results of some cognitive studies, or that want to confront such results
with the hypotheses involved in a particular characterization of incom-
mensurability32. The paper of Andersen included in the present book is
linked with this trend.
As it is well known, the so called cognitive sciences intend to achieve a
characterization of cognition grounded in empirical results and informed
by studies produced by a cluster of different disciplines. As language is
an aspect of cognition, connections have been established between cog-
nitive sciences and the linguistic approach to incommensurability. This
holds especially for the taxonomic characterization of incommensurabil-
ity. The taxonomic characterization historically developed in close asso-
ciation with considerations about language acquisition and conceptual
learning processes (Kuhn himself has been committed to this trend and
strongly contributed to reinforcing it, if not to inaugurating it). Cog-
nitive sciences have something to say about such processes. This part
of cognitive studies is certainly the most exploited one in cognitively-
informed philosophical reflections on the incommensurability problem —
usually for the purpose of finding empirical support in favour of philo-
sophical theses. This is the line followed by Hanne Andersen in the
present volume, cognitive sciences being convened in order to sustain a
conception of incommensurability based on dynamical frames.
5. What can be called the Wittgensteinian approach to sci-
ence and incommensurability33 has a certain autonomy with respect to
the linguistic and pragmatic approaches even if it is intertwined with
them in several respects. The paper of Aristides Baltas contained in the
32[Andersen, Barker & Chen 1996]; [Barker 2001]; [Barker, Chen & Andersen 2003];
[Bird 2002b]; [Bird 2004]; [Chen, Andersen & Barker 1998]; [Nercessian & Andersen
1997].
33See for example the works of A. Baltas, M. Bitbol, M. Carrier, V. Kindi and R.
Read mentioned in the bibliography. See also [Andersen 2000].
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present volume represents this tendency. The one of Martin Carrier is
also linked to it, although less directly, since it is developed on the basis
of a Wittgensteinian-inspired theory of language.
Wittgenstein-inspired accounts of incommensurability have become
more and more praised in recent decades and constitute a living active
tendency today. They are often part of a broader project aiming at
reading Kuhn from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Kuhn, as he explic-
itly recognized, has been influenced by the philosophy of Wittgenstein,
especially by Wittgenstein’s conception of language. Many followers of
Wittgenstein appreciate Kuhn’s work because of its intimate proximity
to their orientation. One has even been up to call Kuhn “a Wittgen-
steinian of the sciences”34.
Approaching incommensurability in aWittgensteinian framework con-
sists most of the time in the adoption of some Wittgenstenian key-
concepts and fundamental insights for the purpose of clarifying what
is really at stake. Language-games, forms of life, grammar, ‘meaning
is use’, family resemblances, etc., are put at the service of the task of
clarifying incommensurability and renewing its characterization. Such
attempts integrate most of the time some pragmatic aspects of incom-
mensurability, without ignoring its linguistic dimension (the later being
— depending of the authors — more or less important in the whole pic-
ture), so that many connexions and reciprocal teachings can be found
between the Wittgensteinian approach on the one hand, and the neo-
pragmatic and linguistic ones on the other. In his article, Aristides
Baltas intends to understand incommensurability as a change of gram-
matical space. In order to do so he takes into account linguistic changes
involving non-explicit aspects of language, without reducing incommen-
surability to a purely linguistic phenomenon.
Survey of the Contributions
1. Alexander Bird gives a contribution to a debate that began in the
Seventies and is still alive nowadays through ever more refined argu-
ments.
At the most general level, the question is to know up to what point
incommensurability threatens trans-paradigmatic stability of the refer-
ence of scientific terms. The central epistemological issue at stake is
scientific realism. Indeed, it is difficult to support realism without a min-
imum of historical continuity. Yet, the thesis that the history of science
34[Read 2003].
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shows the existence of scientific revolutions with corresponding pre- and
post-revolutionary incommensurable theories, is precisely the negation
of cumulative scientific development. The strategy of many realists have
been to try to save cumulativity by preserving a certain continuity at
the level of reference. They have intended to show that, although there
indeed are scientific revolutions at the level of concepts and meanings,
the reference of most scientific terms is nevertheless preserved.
To achieve that goal, most realists tried, at the beginning at least,
to rely on the so-called ‘causal theory of reference’ (CTR). As it is well
known, the CTR has first been elaborated by Kripke for proper names
[Kripke, 1980], and has later been tentatively applied to kind terms.
Roughly speaking, the idea is that human dubbing is rigidly linked to —
since it is caused by — bits of reality through inaugural acts of baptism,
so that the name continues to refer through time, despite any possible
later changes of human beliefs, to the original reference — the real sub-
stance, thing, property. . . — actually involved in the original baptism.
Many authors tried to use the idea, or variants of it, against unde-
sirable epistemological consequences of incommensurability. Hilary Put-
nam’s attempt is certainly the most famous one [Putnam 1973], [Putnam
1975a], [Putnam 1975b]. It initiated a quite famous dialogue with Kuhn
([Kuhn 1989], [Kuhn 1990]) and developed well-known exemplars such
as the one of twin-earth and twin-H2O. But since then, there have been
many other less known interesting attempts to apply the CTR to theory
change as well as to modify the CTR. Attempts to modify it have often
developed in response to the criticism that a pure CTR deprived of any
descriptive elements is untenable (or is useless because it is impossible
to apply it to concrete historical cases). Refined versions of CTR, espe-
cially mixed versions including a minimum of descriptive elements side
by side with the causal non-descriptive ones, have then been elaborated,
providing the basis of a rich and sometimes technical literature on the
relations between incommensurability, realism and the CTR35.
In his book published in 2000, T. Kuhn, Alexander Bird defends the
thesis that, in most historical scientific transitions commonly considered
as revolutionary, reference continuity is indeed preserved. Discussing the
situation of incommensurable theories in the framework of the CTR, he
35See for example [Bird 2000, chapter 5]; [Devitt & Sterelny 1987]; [Kitcher 1978];
[Kitcher 1983]; [Kordig 1971]; [Kroon 1985]; [Kroon 1987]; [Kroon & Nola 2001];
[Nola 1980]; [Norris 1997]; [Papineau 1979]; [Papineau 1996]; [Putnam 1973]; [Putnam
1975a]; [Putnam 1975b]; [Sankey 1991d]; [Sankey 1994a]; [Sankey 1997b]. For critical
reactions to realist attempts based on CTR, see for example [Feyerabend 1987a],
[Kuhn 1989], [Kuhn 1990] and [Read & Sharrok 2002b].
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admits Kuhn’s last definition of incommensurability as untranslatability,
but argues that untranslatability names transformations circumscribed
to the level of sense, so that the reference remains untouched. In so doing
he studies Kuhn’s reply to Putnam, reconsidering Kuhn’s arguments
about cases such as ‘gold’ and ‘water’.
In response to Bird’s book, Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock promptly
criticized Bird’s arguments in a paper published in 2002 [Read & Sharrok
2002b]. The paper of Bird published in the present volume is a reply
to these criticisms. Bird understands these criticism as claiming the
incompatibility, not only in fact but also in principle, of the referentialist
versions of scientific realism on the one hand, and incommensurability as
conceived by the last Kuhn on the other hand. This is the central general
claim he wants to refute, but he also turns to several more specific ones.
Having sketched the general content and central issues of the debate,
Bird began to distinguish two “entirely distinct” but often conflated posi-
tions: on the one hand referentialism, defined as “the idea that reference
is a key concept in assessing the progress of science and that there has
been a large measure of referential continuity over time, even over rev-
olutions”; and on the other hand essentialism, defined as “the view that
natural kinds and perhaps also natural properties have essential charac-
teristics”. He regards as inaccurates Read and Sharrock’s characteriza-
tion of referentialism as “a kind of essentialism” — although he recognizes
intimate relations between essentialism and putnamian referentialism.
Bird examines two versions of referentialism. The first one, called the
“Fregean version” (although it is certainly not literally fregean), holds
that sense determines reference. Bird argues that it is not a good re-
sponse to incommensurabilism, firstly because too much of the theory
may contribute to the reference determination, so that theory change
may well imply reference change, and secondly because it moreover
presents internal troubles, arising from the impossibility to draw a sharp
dividing line between propositions contributing to sense and proposi-
tions contributing to reference. The second version of referentialism,
called the “Kripke-Putnam version” and described as a “causal (. . . ) ex-
ternalist conception of reference determination”, has Bird’s favor, at least
as far as kind terms are concerned. True, “the causal theory of reference
does not in itself guarantee continuity of reference”. But according to
Bird, it “shows how there can be continuity of reference despite even
revolutionary scientific changes, and shows how scientific realism is not
threatened by the thesis of incommensurability as Kuhn formulated it”.
In such a framework, Bird scrutinizes one by one the objections of
Kuhn, Read and Sharrock against the Kipke-Putnam version of the
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CTR, relying mainly on the example of the H2O case. The first ob-
jection, raised by Kuhn, concerns the impossibility – in the sense of an
incompatibility with modern chemistry — of an XYZ substance having
all the superficially observable properties of our H2O. Against it, Bird
first insists that Putnam’s scenario has only to be imaginable, and not
realizable in our world.
The next objection examined reflects on a variation of Putnam’s ini-
tial scenario involving Twin-Earth. Such an alternative scenario had
been introduced by Bird in his book on Kuhn. Bird suggests we recon-
sider Putnam’s argument, situating it in the early nineteenth century,
that is, at a time where scientists did already know that water is H2O
but were not sure that there is no distinct compound sharing the su-
perficial properties of water. In such a situation, Bird claims, “it is not
open to a putative forerunner of Kuhn’s to object that there could be no
such XYZ that has the superficial properties of water but is a different
compound”. Read and Sharrock protest that in such situation, “there
no longer is a thought-experiment”, since the impossibility mentionned
by Kuhn is an impossibility that refers to a given scientific state and
taxonomic structure characterized by a strong solidarity between the
assumption that water is H2O and the assumption that XYZ does not
exist. Bird dissects this interpretation of this answer in three assertions
that he successively intends to refute, accusing Read and Sharrock at
the same time of misunderstanding Putnam’s argument, assuming what
Putnam’s argument wants to disprove, and standing in opposition to the
commitments of chemists.
From this and other considerations, Bird comes to the strong con-
clusion that water “functions like a name and so is a rigid designator”
picking out natural kinds, and that in consequence, “ ‘water is H2O’ is
a necessary truth” — now making the connection between (putnamian)
referentialism and essentialism. He reflects then on the delicate clause ‘to
be a sample of a particular kind’ or ‘to be a sample of the same kind’, ad-
mitting at the same time that “members of the same kind must bear some
deeper similarity than mere superficial resemblances” and that “’same-
ness in kind’ may be fixed contextually” by chemist’s interests. This
leads him to consider another objection of Read and Sharrock, address-
ing the fact that much of what is ordinary called water is not exclusively
H2O (due to impurities). For this reason, referentialists like Bird com-
monly appeal to modalities in their quasi-essentialist statements, saying,
for example, that “’in al possible worlds water consists (largely) of H2O”
(my emphasizes). But then there arises the question, posed by Read and
Sharrock and recurrently addressed to the CTR, of whether “essentialism
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would look so attractive if the impurities included XYZ, in significant
proportions (say 25%)”.
Bird answers, first in appealing to the contextuality of the sameness in
kind relation. According to the context, we have to distinguish different
extensions of the term ‘water’. Now, the extension of ‘water’ as used
in the context of chemistry is not the same than the extension of our
everyday term ‘water’. The first one covers exclusively H2O, whereas the
second one includes impure samples. Bird admits in consequence that
the adjective ‘largely’ should be dropped in the essentialist assertion
above, as long as we are dealing with the chemical term ‘water’. He
focuses then, second, on the empirically not forbidden case in which all
our samples of water would be discovered by chemists to contain a large
proportion of XYZ. In such case, Bird concludes, “we would have to
admit that pure water is not a single chemical kind but is a mixture
of two compounds. And it would certainly be plausible to argue that
water has no real essence (although some might reasonably argue that
it is essentially a mixture of H2O and XYZ)”. But such a possibility, he
continues, “does not show that in the actual case, where our samples are
not such a mixture, water is not essentially H2O”.
Hence, Bird is finally committed to what I would call a ‘revisable es-
sentialism’, according to which essence ascriptions are in principle always
destabilizable by in principle always possible future scientific revolution-
ary discoveries of the kind just mentioned above. The necessity of “all
water consists in H2O” is therefore a conditional necessity, hanging on
the assumption that our science will not meet such destabilizations, the
latter assumption being in turn fed by the realist credo that our science
has indeed grasped enough of the actual elements composing the world.
Bird also examines Kuhn’s developments about the evolutions of our
beliefs concerning the three states of water. Kuhn emphasizes the taxo-
nomic transformation having accompanied the transition from the belief
that liquidity is an essential property of water, to the belief that some-
thing else is and that ice and steam as genuine water. Bird argues, first
that Kuhn’s point is historically inaccurate (many people including Aris-
totle equated ice and steam with water). Second, that even if it were
true that some chemists considered steam and ice as different species, it
is not enough to prove that the extension of the term ‘water’ does not
cover steam and ice. And third, that even if ‘water’ analytically entailed
‘liquid’ in 1750, it would not be damaging for the essentialist, who could
continue to hold that water1750 essentially contains H2O.
Finally, Bird makes some brief remarks on the relation between super-
ficial and ‘deep’ properties with respect to the question their necessity.
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This is a response to a development of Kuhn, in which Kuhn points
out the fundamental solidarity between the elements of the lexical scien-
tific structure, from which he emphasizes that “the so called superficial
properties are no less necessary than their apparent essential successors”.
Bird remains very allusive here, but he accuses Kuhn of irrelevancy and
call for more refined analytical distinctions and studies. He insists on the
need to scrutinize the multiplicity of the plausible configurations (neces-
sary superficial properties and necessary laws of nature; contingent laws
of nature and contingent superficial properties; contingent laws of nature
and necessary superficial properties. . . ). And he points that necessary
properties are not in every case essential properties.
On the whole Bird concludes that Kuhn’s arguments, despite of the
efforts of Read an Sharrock to resurrect and develop them, in themselves
“do not give the scientific realist a reason to doubt her view”. According
to him, the referentialist defense of scientific realism is not threatened
by incommensurability equated with untranslatability.
2. Highly different are the approach and the conclusions of Martin
Carrier — and this illustrates that very divergent positions continue
to constitute the debate on incommensurability nowadays. Let us quote
Martin Carrier’s last sentence: “The lesson incommensurability teaches
is that in the course of theory change, scientific achievements may be
conceptually reframed beyond recognition. In particular, the occurrence
of reference shifts poses a serious threat to the claim that scientific the-
ories accomplish an ever deeper understanding of the same objects and
processes. In this respect the incommensurability thesis retains some
epistemic significance after all”. Correlatively, Carrier’s confidence in
the usefulness of the CTR in relation to these questions appears very
limited36.
In his paper, Martin Carrier reconsiders semantic incommensurabil-
ity, equated with unstranlatability, in the framework of the “theoretical
context account” or “context theory” of meaning, as Kuhn and Feyer-
abend did themselves. He intends to show in the same movement, first
that semantic incommensurability is indeed instantiated in history of
science, and second, that a coherent reconstruction of the notion can be
proposed on the basis of an holistic-contextual theory of meaning.
Such a reconstruction of semantic incommensurability is here de-
veloped and illustrated relying on an historical case largely considered
36In the present volume M. Carrier remains silent about the CTR. But in other
papers he appears at least reluctant to it. See [Carrier 2001, 81] and [Carrier 2002,
141, footnote 2].
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as revolutionary among historians and philosophers of science, namely,
Lorentzian electrodynamics versus Einsteinian special relativity. Through
this example Martin Carrier intends to show why it turns to be impos-
sible to translate one into another central concepts of both theories (in
the example the concept of velocity and the concept of mass).
The skeleton of the argument is the following. According to the
theoretical context account, meaning has two main determinants: the
inferential integration (i.e. the relations of a given concept to other
concepts); and the conditions of application (associated with the set of
situations to which a given concept is thought to apply and not to apply).
A good translation has to preserve meaning. It has thus to satisfy two
demands: preservation of the inferential relations, and retention of the
conditions of application. Incommensurable concept are untranslatable,
because in their case, only one of these two demands can be fulfilled,
but never both of them.
The ultimate reason of such an impossibility lies, according to Mar-
tin Carrier, in the fact that the two rival theories assume contrasting
and incompatible set of laws, that is, deep divergences at the level of the
corresponding inferential relations. As a consequence of this nomological
change, natural kinds are restructured: very different and often incom-
patible classes of equivalence hold before and after a revolution (what
was thought to be different may be thought of the same type; radically
new ‘natural’ kinds may appear; old central ‘natural’ kinds may com-
pletely disappear. . . ). With respect to this point, Martin Carrier claims
to reverse the order of priority assumed by Kuhn between nomological
change and split up of scientific kinds. True, the last Kuhn put the re-
structuring of kind taxonomy at the center, and seemed thus to assume
kind restructurings to be the primary factor and nomological change to
be a derived secondary feature.
Martin Carrier last aim is to show that semantic incommensurability,
understood in the way previously spelled out, is not at all the threat it
has often appeared to be for rational theory comparison. According
to him, “empirical comparison does not require translation and remains
largely unaffected by incommensurability”. He illustrates the point on
two examples: the series of experiments performed by Walter Kaufmann
between 1901 and 1905, intended to measure the dependence of the mass
of electrons upon their velocity; and the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment
of 1932 aiming at comparing Lorentz’s and Einstein’s theories in the
spirit of Michelson-Morley experiments.
In order to argue the point, Martin Carrier begins to emphasize that
incommensurable theories, not only de facto have, considering proto-
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typical historical cases, shared relevant phenomena, but moreover must
have such shared phenomena. Otherwise, incommensurability would be
epistemologically non significant. “A conflict between two theories only
emerges if there is some shared realm which they jointly address”; “Ad-
vocates of each theories have to acknowledge responsibility for coping
with these phenomena (which may be disparately understood in either
theory). But this much of a common ground is secured by the mere fact
that we are dealing with incommensurable theories”.
We encounter here the delicate question, already introduced above
in the general presentation, of the ineluctable tension existing between
incommensurability understood as a complete absence of common mea-
sure, and the requirement that incommensurable theories must be com-
peting theories (if incommensurability is to name an interesting prob-
lem) and must therefore have some common phenomenal measure. And
we see how Martin Carrier overcomes such difficulty: by assuming a
sort of analytical link between incommensurability and the requirement
to claim responsibility for at least some identical targeted phenomena.
Each camp will describe and interpret these common experiments and re-
sults differently, within his own conceptual incommensurable framework,
and each will evaluate the significance of the corresponding interpreted
results for his own theory. With respect to these task, “no need for trans-
lation arises”. Thus incommensurability understood as untranslatability,
although real, does not prevent empirical comparison. Moreover, such
an empirical comparison can be performed by one and the same person,
because of the possibility, elaborated by Kuhn, of bilingualism.
From all this Martin Carrier concludes that incommensurability, un-
derstood as untranslatability in the sense specified in the paper, is ground-
ed in “incompatibility rather than unrelatedness”. In fact, incommensu-
rability results from a tension between deep differences and required
similarities. On the one hand, incommensurable concepts do not satisfy
both the demands of sameness of conditions of application and preser-
vation of theoretical integration. But on the other hand, “the converse
aspects deserves emphasis as well: incommensurable concepts exhibit a
particular type of relationship to each other; they are connected with
one another by empirical or theoretical ties”. And the difference mani-
fested through translation failure is not any kind of difference, so that
the translation failure characteristic of incommensurability is itself not
any kind of translation failure. “Not any old taxonomic disagreement
is sufficient for producing incommensurability”. “It is a distinctive fea-
ture of incommensurability that the relevant classificatory discrepancies
resist reciprocal adaptation because they arise from fundamental theo-
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retical divergence. Non-translatability due to incommensurability is not
the result of a simple conceptual gap. Incommensurability is not about
an accidentally missing word; it is rather about an in-principle rift”.
As we shall see, such conclusions are very close to the one endorsed
by Hanne Andersen in this book.
3. Martin Carrier’s paper is the object of three commentaries, which
are the written (sometimes enlarged) versions of talks given in march
2002 in Nancy, at the occasion of a day organized by the Poincaré
Archives in honor of Martin Carrier’s work on incommensurability.
The first commentary consists in two brief remarks by André Coret.
One is about the relation between Martin Carrier’s conception of incom-
mensurability on the one hand, and realism and relativism on the other
hand; the other is about the identification of incommensurability with
untranslatability.
The second commentary is a discussion, by Soazig Le Bihan, of
Martin Carrier’s reconstruction of incommensurability. Soazig Le Bihan
investigates the logical relations between three terms: inferential rela-
tions, conditions of application and the clause “the set of situations to
which a concept is properly applied”. She questions the independence
and the symmetrical role of the two former in the determination of mean-
ing, and she then argues that the chief criterion of meaning and transla-
tion should be the third. Finally, she suggests that a more adequate and
sound reconstruction of incommensurability could be achieved in shift-
ing from semantic theory of meaning to semantic theory of science. In
the later framework, semantic incommensurability would be defined as
an (at least partial) incompatibility as regard to internal structure (non
congruence of the models of the theories).
The third commentary is a exam, by Léna Soler, of the way Martin
Carrier uses the two conditions ‘sameness of conditions of application’
and ‘preservation of inferential relations’ in order to reconstruct incom-
mensurability. I argues that two different senses of ‘conditions of applica-
tion’, and correlatively two different understandings of the clause ‘trans-
lation according to preservation of inferential relations’, are involved in
Martin Carrier’s analysis of historical cases, and that once these senses
are distinguished, the seductive symmetric conclusion of Martin Carrier
does no more hold. Hoping to contribute to Martin Carrier’s general
project by complementary means, I introduce more fined-grained dis-
criminations and try to clarify some central difficulties. In Martin Car-
rier’s paper these difficulties take a particular form, but in my opinion,
they manifest fundamental difficulties inherent to any holistic-contextual
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framework — and thus difficulties that will appear inevitable to anyone
thinking that holistic and contextual features are essential features of
scientific practices. On the basis of these distinctions and analyses, I
investigate the links between conditions of application and inferential
relations and, finally, sketch an alternative characterization of semantic
incommensurability in which the ‘inferential relations’ determinant ap-
pears as the central and primary determinant (from a methodological
point of view at least).
4. Hanne Andersen starts from Kuhn last characterization of in-
commensurability in terms of non homology of taxonomic structures and
violations of the no-overlap principle. She argues that such a character-
ization, although based on a plausible model sustained by some recent
works on categorization in cognitive psychology, is nevertheless not a
sufficient one to distinguish between revolutionary and non revolution-
ary transitions. She makes propositions to complete and refine Kuhn’s
characterization, by insisting on the fact that taxonomic structures are
dynamical entities, and by focusing on the reasons why they sometimes
drastically change.
According to her, following a suggestion of Murphy and Medin, one
must take into account, in order to distinguish incommensurable theories
from cases of refinements and additions, not just the taxonomic structure
and its given correlations of features in themselves, but, moreover, the
justifications sustaining such correlations. These justifications are given
by the theories underlying the conceptual framework. Indeed, the ac-
cepted explanations involved in theories, at the same time determine the
bundling that organize previously encountered cases, determine which
combinations are in principle possible and thus empirically expectable
(even if they have not been actually empirically encountered at this point
of the inquiry), and determine which combinations are in principle ruled
out. Only such theoretically impossible combinations would, if empiri-
cally encountered, constitute a severe anomaly. The integration of such
an anomaly would call the conceptual structure into question. It would
lead to a deep restructuration of the previous taxonomy, corresponding
to new bundlings of features, new divisions, new categories, new ob-
jects. In other words, we would have a case of incommensurability: the
case of two unsuperimposable structures coordinated with two mutually
exclusive theoretical systems and two mutually exclusive ontologies.
Although achieved by non identical trajectories and analytical means,
Hanne Andersen’s last conclusion is perfectly congruent with Martin
Carrier’s one when attempting to characterize the specific kind of con-
trast that is responsible for incommensurability. Hanne Andersen also
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suggests a way to clarify the same difficulty, inherent to the incommen-
surability problem, that, as we have seen, Carrier examined too: the
difficulty, described as “a serious challenge that has shown very difficult
to handle”, “to explain how theories that are incommensurable theories
can nevertheless compete”.
Non-competing theories, equated with theories pertaining to sepa-
rated disciplines or specialities, could be called ‘incommensurable’ in a
more strict and radical sense than competing theories (and Kuhn some-
times called the first ones ‘incommensurable’). But then it seems that
they would be incommensurable precisely because they are not ‘about
the same thing’ (or to put it metaphorically, following Kuhn’s and An-
dersen’s imagery: because they are theories occupying separated niches).
By contrast, rival theories like Newtonian and Einsteinian physics are
conceived as theories targeting the same object. For this reason it seems
at first sight that they could be incommensurable in an epistemologically
consequential sense. But can they really be incommensurable in a strong
sense, since they must target something like the same domain?
Andersen’s proposition in order to distinguish these two cases and to
tackle the associated difficulty is the following. We have a case of incom-
mensurability in Kuhn’s original sense, that is, a case of incommensu-
rability between rival theories, if and only if the two theories involved,
although being differently structured, bundle (at least some) shared fea-
tures. “While it is shared structure and not shared features that yields
shared ontology, when structure is no longer shared, it is shared features
that provides the overlap between different phenomenal worlds necessary
for them to compete in offering the better account of the world in the
form of more successful or more promising bundlings”.
5. Aristides Baltas is, at a point, led to the same difficulty, but
the spirit of his project, and the picture emerging from it, sounds differ-
ently, although there is maybe no contradiction at the level of general
thesis. The project is to reformulate and clarify incommensurability in
a wittgensteinian framework.
Aristides Baltas puts at the center what he calls the “grammatical
resources of the paradigm”. The grammatical resources refer to a set of
‘assumptions’ with quotes, where the quotes indicate that the assump-
tions in question are, within a given paradigm, not identified or expressed
as such, or at least not subject to discussion, to justification, to test pro-
cedures or the like. Remaining tacit or not questioned, it is silently
that they perform their work. This work is inextricably semantical and
methodological. The considered ‘assumptions’, at the same time consti-
tute “the latent part of meaning” and channel the investigation process.
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They give its usual or natural interpretation to the conceptual system
coordinated with the paradigm. They underlie the favored analogies
and pictures. They determine what is possible and impossible, waited
or unexpected, obvious or questionable, important or anecdotic, given
or open to test. . . All this constitute a grammatical space, with its
potentialities and its bounds.
In such a framework, radical scientific change is described as a “leap
into the ungrammatical”. This happens through the following pattern.
In the course of the investigation of nature by the characteristic means
of a given paradigm, deadlocks arise and resist. Then at a point, sci-
entists (or at least some of them) become convinced that the only way
to overpass the problems is to turn the deadlock into a definition. In
other words, they now admit what was previously unacceptable and
most of the time unthinkable, or at least unthought, precisely because
it was out of the grammatical bounds of the paradigm. In this move-
ment, some previously hidden ‘assumptions’ are disclosed. They become
illuminated, they are suddenly viewed as assumptions without quotes,
transformed into propositions subject to discussion and test. The work
they surreptitiously performed before is now rendered explicit. What
they previously induced and forbid is now clarified. On the whole, a
new and broader grammatical space is opened. A new vantage point is
thus available. From such a new vantage point, the assumptions constitu-
tive of the old paradigm appear, ex post facto, as unawares unjustifiably
presuppositions, and correlatively, the anomalies having led to the rev-
olution appear as misconstructions due to the work of old illegitimate
pre-judgments.
On the basis of such a reading of incommensurability, Aristides Baltas
intends to show that the ideals of rationality and scientific progress can
be saved from the accusations of relativism recurrently directed against
Kuhn’s work, and that some varieties of realism are compatible with
kuhnian inspired positions.
In order to achieve that aim, he analyzes anomalies as resistances
originating in a world independent of ideas and forcing scientists, be it
only negatively, to recognize the inadequacy of their current paradigms.
He examines the very nature of the communication breakdown between
scientists residing in incommensurable paradigms, arguing for its in-
evitability, but pointing at the same time available means to cope with
it, relying on the large amount of common assumptions.
Indeed there is, argues A. Baltas, a kind of continuity between suc-
ceeding paradigms. First, the two parties share an enormous grammat-
ical space and large areas of common language: there are blind spots,
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but these are circumscribed. Second, two competing paradigms are never
totally unrelated. A scientist having experienced a revolutionary tran-
sition and living now in the new paradigm is always able to spell out
significant relations between the old and the new paradigms — espe-
cially in the case of mathematical physics. A. Baltas sketches an analysis
of the potential corresponding conceptual, empirical and mathematical
relations. He talks about imperfect and fragmentary translations and
(re)interpretations, or sometimes about “interpretation/translation” in
order to indicate that his use of the word “translation” is not the specific
one retained by Kuhn in his late characterization of incommensurability
as non-translatability [Kuhn 1983a]. Among significant relations that
can be spelled out between two succeeding paradigms, we find an impor-
tant one targeting phenomena. Indeed — and third, a sense has to be
given to the idea that the two parties share identical phenomena to be
explained, even if it is not strictly correct to talk about the same phe-
nomena tout court. We have to admit that “something of the materiality
of the phenomena (. . . ) is carried invariant across the leap”. Otherwise
we are no more able to render justice to the shared assumption that
the old and the new paradigms are competing paradigms — here we
encounter one more time the difficult question, enounced in the general
presentation above and also faced by Andersen’s paper, of giving sense
to the idea that paradigms are at the same time rival and incommensu-
rable. According to A. Baltas we have to admit — with qualifications —
that the new paradigm “capture the same ‘something’ that resisted its
capture by the old” paradigm. This is what “makes the new paradigm
not merely different from the old, but the one that succeeds it”.
On the whole, the new paradigm conserves somehow, at different
levels and notably at the level of phenomena, the memory of the old.
The post-paradigm continues to enfold the impossibilities of the pre-
paradigm to cope with determined anomalies, even if, by construction,
it enfolds these impossibilities under the form of a “repressed memory”.
“In repressing this memory, it resolves the anomaly and becomes the
grammatical space of a new paradigm; but still enfolding it, it remains
linked to the old and thence continuous with it in this sense”.
Such a continuity constitutes, joined with a claim of asymmetry that
we are going to consider now, the support of A. Baltas’ claim accord-
ing to which incommensurability is perfectly compatible with scientific
progress. The pre- and post- paradigms, he insists, are not at all in an
equivalent position. On the contrary, there is an inherent asymmetry
between them. To analyze the nature of such asymmetry shows that the
post- is objectively superior to the pre-.
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The succeeding paradigm is, first, objectively wider than the preced-
ing one. Indeed, more is thinkable and visible in it – and this holds inde-
pendently of any claim concerning its empirical adequacy. From the new
vantage point P2, The post-revolutionary scientists are aware of assump-
tions that remained unseen or unquestioned by the pre-revolutionary
scientists. They can show how these assumptions assured the coher-
ence of the old conceptual system. They can render explicit what these
assumptions suggested and what they forbid. They can give reasons
concerning why it was questionable to endorse them. . .Whereas the pre-
revolutionary scientists cannot, remaining blind to these assumption and
a fortiori to their effects. Hence, the sort of ‘interpretation-translation’
involved here is a “one way” interpretation-translation, only performable
from the new to the old. The new grammatical space, the new horizon
of the inquiry, is thus objectively wider than the old one.
As a particular case, it is wider as well at the level of evaluations of
empirical adequacy/non-adequacy. Post-revolutionary scientists have at
their disposal explanations spelling out why old scientists encountered
certain empirical anomalies and were not able to overcome them. They
can give reasons for the success and failure of the way P1 accounted
for its empirical phenomena, and they are able to account successfully
for at least some phenomena (as reinterpreted) that were at the heart
of the deadlocks having originated the revolutionary change. Whereas
adherents of the old paradigms do not have symmetric means at hands:
they remained blocked. The former has the advantage on the latter, also
at the level of “rhetorical ammunition”. The former possess objectively
powerful means than the later in order to convince of the superiority
of their viewpoint. They have thus more chances to succeed than their
adversaries.
Moreover, the involved asymmetry induces a strong irreversibility.
Once scientists have seen, they cannot do as if they had not seen. There
is no possibility to go back. In that sense, once a wider grammatical
space have been opened, the old paradigm is definitively superseded;
there is no real choice between the old and the new.
The pattern just described is what constitutes scientific progress as
understood by A. Baltas. Scientific progress so understood takes places
intricately at both conceptual and empirical levels, and it is a genuine
progress, although not a cumulative one.
So far, we dealt with incommensurability in the traditional sense.
Now, the two last paper of the book enlarge the perspective in consid-
ering the case of the machinic-literal incommensurability.
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6. Michel Bitbol considers the incommensurability problem in a
neo-pragmatic and structural perspective. This perspective is funda-
mentally sympathetic to Wittgensteinian insights, although these are not
explicitly mentioned in the article. Michel Bitbol urges the incomplete-
ness of the linguistic-based account of incommensurability, and argues for
the fruitfulness of an explanation that equates the technico-experimental
practices, and more generally the performative aspects, with the central
axis of physical knowledge. He is then led to discuss machinic-literal
incommensurability.
He begins in distinguishing three strata within a physical paradigm:
the ontological, the performative and the structural ones. The ontologi-
cal stratum is associated with models, representations, physical scenarios
or stories (it is, in other words, the narrative side of high-level theo-
ries). The performative stratum names the instrumental and behavioral
culture characteristic of a laboratory tradition (including the technico-
experimental knowing-how, the specific goals of concrete realizations and
so on). The structural stratum designates the mathematical formalism
and the associated legal-predictive potentialities of high-level theories
(such a formal skeleton being possibly the common core of a range of
different and incompatible ontological interpretations and models).
From there Michel Bitbol stresses two points. 1/ All is not linguistic,
verbalised and explicit in the paradigm, especially at the performative
level: here in particular, the philosopher must take into account com-
mitments and projects, backgrounds norms of action, acquired habitus,
entertainment to act in certain ways, knowing how, tacit background
knowledge, etc. 2/ Although the three strata are in fact related, each of
them have a certain non negligible autonomy.
These two points constitute the basis on which Michel Bitbol de-
velops his conception of a non linguistic kind of incommensurability: an
incommensurability of laboratory practices inspired by the work of Pick-
ering and Hacking, also labeled “performative incommensurability” since
it primarily concerns the performative stratum37.
37“Performative incommensurability” is an expression first introduced by A. Pick-
ering. But in his paper, M. Bitbol uses the expression in a quite different sense
than Pickering’s original one. In Pickering text, “performative incommensurability”
names the possibility of an extreme form of incommensurability, in fact just sketched
but not really explored. This possible incommensurability would involve more exotic
practices than the scientific ones. It have been for this reason let aside in the general
presentation above, but here is an occasion to mention it.
Pickering talks about “the possibility of a radical performative incommensurability
— an incommensurability of powers” [Pickering 1995, 245], an “incommensurability
in human (and non human) powers” [Pickering 1995, 192], residing in the contrast
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Such an incommensurability of laboratory practices may happen in
the absence of any incommensurability at the structural-ontological lev-
els: it may happen between scientific practices sharing a lot structurally
and ontologically — the possibility of this disconnecting being opened
by the relative autonomy of the three layers. Correlatively, such an in-
commensurability cannot be grasped through an exclusively-linguistic
characterization — due to the non verbal and implicit constitutive as-
pects of laboratory practices.
Incommensurability of laboratory practices names the relation be-
tween two highly different forms of laboratory life: between laboratory
cultures that are organized by very different background presuppositions
and that involve mutually exclusive gestures, experimental setups, exper-
imental configurations and results. M. Bitbol gives two examples. The
example of two laboratory traditions in high-energy physics, the first
one being governed by a culture based on images (produced via bubble
chambers etc.), and the second one by a culture of counting (electronic
detectors like scintillation counter, spark chambers etc.). And the ex-
ample of experimental chemical practices before and after Lavoisier, the
second one conferring a crucial advocating role to scales, whereas the first
one takes such procedures as non crucial, non significant or sometimes
even irrelevant.
Reading Michel Bitbol’s developments, it appears that such labo-
ratory traditions are autonomous in several senses. First they are au-
tonomous with respect to one another as well as to higher-level theo-
retical strata, in the sense of possessing proper internal characteristics
and having relatively independent internal conditions of coherence and
closure. But they are moreover autonomous in a stronger sense with
respect to high-level theories: they are credited of having the power
to be (sometimes) the driving force of important changes at the higher
between standard and non standard performances. “None of the studies I have dis-
cussed involve much more of human beings than observing what is going on and
manipulating medium-size objects in humdrum ways”. But in some cultures we find
“non-standard material agency, (. . . ), stories, for example, of mines inhabited by
dwarves, demons (. . . ). On the other side, we also find human beings with quite
non-standard powers — magi, alchemists, witches, and so on” [Pickering 1995, 243].
“Within different cultures human beings and the material world might exhibit capac-
ities for action quite different from those we customarily attribute to them”. “The
question remains of whether we should think it”, but “that our own powers as human
beings might be bound up with culture in this way is a quite startling idea that I
find it fascinating to dwell upon. It is, of course, absent from traditional discussion
of incommensurability” [Pickering 1995, 245].
Bitbol “performative incommensurability” is closer to what Pickering names “ma-
chinic incommensurability”.
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structural and ontological levels (and as a particular case, of having the
power to impulse the development of incommensurable theories). This
may happen when they presuppose, most of the time tacitly, assump-
tions and characteristics which prove to be in tension or disharmony
with some central assumptions of the theoretical levels. In such a situa-
tion they contain, in a way potentially, the power to destabilize higher
strata, or in other words the seeds of theoretical revolutions. And that
sometimes indeed happen. Thus high-level explicit theories and high-
level (in general less explicit) values governing theoretical elaboration,
are not, as some philosophers of science have often assumed, the only or
the primary actual driving vector of scientific changes.
Michel Bitbol’s paper develops such ideas in association with other
claims that have consequences for the incommensurability problem. Ac-
cording to him and to many neo-pragmatic thinkers, traditional dual
schemes putting face-to-face a knowing subject and a preexisting object,
or a proposing-scientist and a nature-thing, or theories and phenomena
or the like, have to be replaced by a co-production scheme according to
which the two poles of each duality are nothing more and nothing less
than the meta-stable products that have co-emerged from an internal-
to-practices dialectical process.
Following [Hacking 1992], M. Bitbol emphasizes moreover that in
such a neo-pragmatical perspective, the classical Duhem-Quine under-
determination of scientific theories has to be enlarged in principle, so
as to include the new elements of experimental practices (notably the
material and performative ones) that have been recognized susceptible
to enter into the possible infinite combinations constituting empirical
co-adjustments. He militates in favor of the notion of a generalized co-
herence that would apply not only to ideas or propositions, but also to
concrete actions. But he recalls at the same time with Hacking that
we need to reflect, correlatively, on the reasons why the feeling of under-
determination is so reduced in practice. Finally he examines the tempta-
tion to maintain certain form of realism in such a framework, grounding
the reflection on the new epistemological situation offered by quantum
mechanics, and extending it to the case of mathematical practices.
7. In his paper Emiliano Trizio intends, for his part, to clarify
the relations between two forms of incommensurability that are con-
sidered to be intrinsically different. The first one is the ‘traditional’
kuhnian incommensurability identified with taxonomic untranslatabil-
ity. The second one is the machinic-literal incommensurability intro-
duced by Hackingand Pickering, and presented by them as a new form
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of incommensurability having nothing to do with meaning change and
untranslatability (cf. above).
According to Emiliano Trizio, taxonomic and literal incommensu-
rabilities, far for being two different in nature, well separated episte-
mological configurations, are, rather, two particular species of a generic
super-ordinate characterization of incommensurability describable as “an
enlarged taxonomic version of incommensurability”.
In order to argue for this thesis, Emiliano Trizio provides a deep
analysis — notably inspired by Pierre Duhem’s and Nancy Cartwright’s
discussions of the (often instrumented) relations between theory and ob-
servation — of what we may mean when we say that scientific terms
“apply to nature”. He urges fine-grained discriminations between differ-
ent kinds of applications to the world. The aim of such discriminations
is, above all, to capture and highlight what he takes to be an essential
difference: namely, the difference between applications that involve in-
strumented acts of measurements and applications that are exempt of
such kind of acts. Kuhn is accused to remain blind to such a difference
especially in his latest works, this blindness being manifest in Kuhn’s
uniform treatment of all scientific examples, regardless of the degree of
abstraction of the theories and of the degree of sophistication of experi-
mental activities involved.
Let us reconstruct Emiliano Trizio’s own position. The philosopher
of science reflecting on modern physics should pay more attention to the
difference between perceiving and measuring. Indeed, unaided, normal
perception and highly instrumented cognitive activities involved in ex-
periments are two different kinds of acts of the knowing subject, two
performances that have an “intrinsically different status”. There are,
correspondingly, two kinds of terms or, if one focuses on structured clus-
ters of terms, two kinds of taxonomies: terms or “taxonomies that can
be applied perceptually”; and terms or “taxonomies that require acts of
measurements”. Consequently the “ostensive/non ostensive character”
of a theory is introduced, or more realistically — shifting from sharp
contrapositions to a continuous scale of ‘ostensiveness’ — the degree of
‘ostensiveness’ of a theory, that is, its “degree of perceptual accessibility”.
Moreover and correlatively the idea — central for the suggested enlarged
conception of incommensurability — of dual/non-dual taxonomies is for-
mulated
An example of non-dual taxonomy is a “perceptual” or “observational”
taxonomy, the most obvious example being the “common-sense” tax-
onomies underlying ordinary observations (but “descriptive sciences” are
also mentioned), which involve only “ready-for-use” terms: only terms
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that are, in a given context, immediately applicable on the basis of an act
of unaided, normal perception. By contrast, a dual taxonomy moreover
contains terms that are split into different sets in turn linked to disparate
specific instrumented conditions of application. Taxonomies of contem-
porary physics, or taxonomies of any physico-mathematical theory, are
dual.
A dual taxonomy is called “dual” because it is composed of two parts
(or two “semi-dual taxonomies”): the “experimental part” and the “objec-
tive part”. The experimental part is composed by names and descriptions
targeting different sets of instrumented experiments: each of these sets
being “the class of equivalence of all possible experiments leading to the
same conclusion (conceptually unified by physical theory)” which “can in
turn be divided in types of experiments”, subtypes etc. The “objective
part” of the dual taxonomy is composed by descriptive terms purporting
to refer to the world (is only composed by “objective terms” referring to
reality).
The two parts of the dual taxonomy are “highly interrelated”. Roughly
speaking, the types of laboratory practices constituting the experimen-
tal part define the appropriate conditions of application of the objective
terms. The relation between the two components is more exactly de-
scribed as a relation of “co-classification” (“the entities physical theory
describes are classified if and only if the experimental contexts that reveal
them are classified in turn”), or as a relation of “co-subsumption” on the
one hand of what is equated with objective entities and processes, and,
on the other hand, of actions in experimental contexts. In other words,
the interrelation is of the following nature: experimental actions aim at
measuring physical objective quantities; and reciprocally, physical the-
oretical quantities supposed to refer to physical objective unobservable
realities cannot be recognized as such without performing experimental
actions and assuming the relevance and reliability of these actions. Now,
assuming the relevance and reliability of these actions amounts in turn
to be committed to assumptions that order the available experimental
activities in classes taken as equivalent with respect to the determination
of the targeted physical quantities and that give a definite particular
content to the methodological condition of the repeatability of the ex-
periments.
An inverse proportionality holds between the ostensive strength of a
theory and the dual character of its taxonomy. In the case of descriptive
sciences, the experimental part of the dual taxonomy is most of the time
embryonic if not null, whereas in contemporary mathematical physics,
it is hypertrophic (the last point being illustrated in the paper through
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the case of the crystalline lattice structure). The role of perceptual
similarities is very reduced in mathematical physics: the dual taxonomy
groups into equivalent classes — via the experimental part — infinitely
different perceptual features.
Linking the latter reflections and distinctions to the theory-learning
process , it appears that we have to take into account a “hierarchy of
increasingly concrete and quantitatively defined exemplars” in Kuhn’s
sense of the term, some of which include experimental instrumented
actions in the laboratory. However, to learn theories by solving paradig-
matic problems through expositions to (more or less ostensive and dual)
exemplars, does not amount to ‘genuinely apply scientific terms to na-
ture’. Kuhn conflates learning or understanding a theory (by solving
problems with a pencil and a sheet of paper) with “applying it to the
world” (and he mainly focused on the first activity, more and more exclu-
sively characterized in terms of linguistic differences). But the authentic
application of a theory to the world only takes place during a real lab-
oratory session involving the recognition that what happens before our
eyes is the situation described (in an idealized and purified way) in the
textbooks. Now, very talented skilful problem-solvers may be completely
lost in a well-equipped laboratory.
Thus on the whole, dealing with the application of scientific concepts
to nature, we have to take into account, not only degrees of concreteness
of the exemplars, not only degrees in the extension of the experimental
part of dual-taxonomies but, moreover and above all, degrees of acquain-
tance. Authentic application requires the coordination of (more or less
ostensive, more or less dual) scientific taxonomies and exemplars with
indeed experienced concrete (instrumented in the dual-case) situations.
Relying on these distinctions Trizio claims that an “enlarged taxo-
nomic formulation” of incommensurability can be defined. “Incommen-
surability results, in general, from a deep transformation of the taxon-
omy pertaining to a theory, where the term “taxonomy” can refer both
to dual taxonomies and to more descriptive ones. In the case of lab-
oratory science, this transformation implies the replacement of a dual
taxonomy with a new, incompatible one”. In such framework, Hack-
ing’s and Pickering’s versions of incommensurability on the one hand,
and Kuhnian incommensurability on the other (illustrated through the
example of Ptolemaic/Copernican astronomies), can be equated to two
particular extreme cases of such “enlarged taxonomic incommensurabil-
ity” in the spectrum of “an ideal classification of theories with respect to
the strength of their ostensive character and the inversely proportional
duality of their taxonomies”.
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Hacking’s and Pickering’s cases correspond to “theories that differ
radically not only with respect to the objective part of their dual tax-
onomies, but also with respect to the experimental part”. In other words,
they involves “two rival schools of physicists accepting different dual tax-
onomies that define distinct classes of equivalence of experimental set-
tings and procedures”, so that the “two rival theories are supported by
disjoint sets of measurement procedures”.
Between such a configuration and Kuhn’s example concerning Ptole-
maic/Copernican astronomies, all intermediary cases may be conceived
(although their plausibility remains to be examined): all combinations
that may be generated from the idea that only some elements are not
shared in the objective and experimental parts of the dual taxonomies.
8. The bibliography at the end of the volume contains the refer-
ences mentioned by each contributor in his own paper, plus a selection
of references about the incommensurability problem that takes into ac-
count the descriptive, axiologic and machinic dimensions. Given the
impressive volume of the literature devoted to incommensurability and
the space allowed, it has been impossible to provide the reader with a
complete bibliography. I emphasized recent works and tried to include
all the major classical references38.
38I am particularly grateful to Alexander Bird and Emiliano Trizio for helping me
by their critical comments and their remarks concerning the English language; I am
further indebted to Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Howard Sankey and Scott Walter who
read and commented parts of this introduction.
